Managed security service provider (MSSP) networks are a form of collaboration where several firms share resources such as diagnostics, prevention tools, and policies to provide security for their computer networks. While the decision to outsource the security operations of an organization may seem counterintuitive, there are potential benefits from joining an MSSP network that include pooling of risk and access to more security-enabling resources and expertise. We examine structural results explaining the reasons firms join an MSSP network, and characterize the growth of MSSP network size under different forms of ownership (monopoly versus consortium). We find that the need for an initial investment in MSSP networks (which is necessary to overcome the stalling effect) only affects the optimal network size for a consortium but has no impact on the optimal network size for a profit-maximizing monopolist. Our results provide an explanation why the majority of the MSSPs are for-profit entities and consortium-based MSSPs are less common. Such a market structure can be attributed to the potential for larger size by the for-profit MSSP owner combined with beneficial pricing structure and a lack of growth uncertainty for the early clients.
This paper presents analytical, computational, and empirical analyses of strategies for intelligent bid formulations in online auctions. We present results related to a weighted-average ascending price auction mechanism that is designed to provide opaque feedback information to bidders and presents a challenge in formulating appropriate bids. Using limited information provided by the mechanism, we design strategies for software agents to make bids intelligently. In particular, we derive analytical results for the important characteristics of the auction, which allow estimation of the key parameters; we then use these theoretical results to design several bidding strategies. We demonstrate the validity of designed strategies using a discrete event simulation model that resembles the mechanisms used in treasury bills auctions, business-to-consumer (B2C) auctions, and auctions for environmental emission allowances. In addition, using the data generated by the simulation model, we show that intelligent strategies can provide a high probability of winning an auction without significant loss in surplus.